

by the Bush administration on my
 these continued to block progress on a
 r and spring months of 1990, how-
 ie Congress for improving relations
 Aspen Institute's "Indochina Forum"
 between American businessmen and
 ese officials, this one in Bali, Indone-
 ng private-sector interest in develop-
 nam, as well as the concern of Vietnam
 Senator Chuck Robb of Virginia with
 adversary.⁶⁸

ith Vietnam increased in the spring as
 odia heightened concerns about pos-
 een Prince Sihanouk's forces and the
 r, these concerns were expressed in late
 1 sixty-six senators to Secretary of State
 e administration to modify in a funda-
 ; urging among other things the estab-
 oi. In response, the administration not
 ak's political coalition with the Khmer
 intention to initiate direct discussions
 nh.

ne Waters," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 1,

of U.S. government management of foreign policy
 ce officials can collaborate with congressional staff
 to build pressures against an administration's
 cy, the stronger the incentive of those who disagree
 matter of occasional field reports that suggested
 n between Khmer Rouge and FUNCINPEC
 rd Krauss, "U.S. Weighs Shift on Cambodia Policy,"
 it considerable time and attention evaluating such
 e required the administration to cut off aid to the

This policy shift was implemented the following month. My deputy, Kenneth Quinn, met with Vietnam's permanent representative to the United Nations, Trinh Xuan Lang, in early August. At the end of the month I met with Thach's deputy, Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, to lay the ground-work for a meeting the following month in New York between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Thach.

The Baker-Thach encounter occurred on September 27 as the UN General Assembly was convening. The ever-manipulative Thach set the tone for the discussion by presenting Baker, at the outset of the meeting, a copy of Paul Samuelson's classic text *Economics*—which had been translated into Vietnamese! Thach commented that the text was guiding his country toward market-oriented economic reforms. He added, provocatively, that Samuelson's analysis helped him identify "loopholes" in U.S. law that would enable the Bush administration to lift its trade embargo with his country. Thach also urged an end to the administration's opposition to International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to Vietnam, pleading that U.S. policies were only stiffening the resistance of unspecified "hard-liners" in his country to improving bilateral relations. Baker countered by stressing the need to overcome political resistance in the United States to normalization. He said that Vietnam could facilitate progress by supporting the just-published Perm Five framework agreement for settling the Cambodia conflict and resolving the POW/MIA issue. Accommodating congressional pressure, the secretary invited Thach to make a one-day visit to Washington for discussions with General John Vessey and Ann Mills Griffiths of the National League of Families and to meet with interested senators from the Foreign Relations Committee.

Following the Baker-Thach encounter and the foreign minister's visit to Washington, there was another hiatus in contacts with the Vietnamese as both Hanoi and Phnom Penh resisted implementation of the Perm Five plan. Yet pressures again built in Congress for normalization, driven by new reports of military cooperation between Sihanouk's forces and the Khmer Rouge. This time the administration responded by developing a