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Kenneth M. Quinn

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When the Khmer Communists finally defeated the Cambodian Government in April 1975, little was known in the West about this movement. Following their capture of Phnom Penh, it was clear that a forced evacuation of that city was one of the new regime's first steps. The revolutionary process now apparently underway in Cambodia began in some parts of the country as early as 1971. An examination of the experience of southern Cambodia from 1971 to 1974 explains how a small but dedicated force was able to impose a revolution on a society without widespread participation of the peasantry.

POLITICAL CHANGE IN WARTIME

THE KHMER KRAHOM REVOLUTION

IN SOUTHERN CAMBODIA, 1970–1974

by

Kenneth M. Quinn

INTRODUCTION

Recent journalistic accounts of life inside Cambodia after the fall of Phnom Penh have depicted a massive social upheaval which has radically transformed the nature of Khmer society. While this general description of radical social change is available, there actually is very little information regarding the different programs and policies that the new Khmer authorities are implementing. There are some detailed reports of the large-scale exodus from Phnom Penh, but they are not supplemented by many facts about new political, economic, or social arrangements in the countryside.

Some insights about present-day Cambodia may be gained from a study of what occurred in Communist controlled areas prior to 17 April 1975,

since it is now clear that the revolutionary process now being witnessed actually began in some parts of the country as early as late 1971. Studying the dynamics of the political, social, and economic changes which took place in this earlier period may provide some understanding about the form, scope, methods, and sources of the changes believed to be occurring now.

Using the southern Cambodian districts of Kampot, Takeo, Kandal, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces as examples, it is possible to describe and to analyze the process of political change which occurred in areas controlled by the Khmer Communists in Cambodia during the period January 1972 to February 1974. While the conclusions reached on the basis of this study must be limited to these provinces, a subsequent visit to other areas of Cambodia

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(Kampong Cham), conversations with observers in Phnom Penh, and research conducted by others indicate that the same process was occurring in most other areas of Cambodia not controlled by the Lon Nol government.¹

In the areas under Khmer Communist control, a "true revolution," as described by Samuel Huntington, was carried out during this period. Huntington sees such a revolution as: "... a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths in a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government activity and policies."²

In order to demonstrate that such a revolution did occur and to analyze the process by which it was accomplished, Huntington's theory of the Eastern revolution will be used as the model for evaluating the Khmer revolutionary process.


Huntington posits that a revolution is a two-phase process: (1) "a rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them; and (2) the creation and institutionalization of a new political order."³ He sees such revolutions occurring in one of two general patterns, Western or Eastern. In the Western model (French, Russian, Mexican), the political institutions of the old regime collapse, new groups are mobilized into politics, and, finally, new political institutions are created. An Eastern revolution (Vietnam and the latter stages of the Chinese revolution), in contrast, begins with the mobilization of new groups into politics and the creation of a new political institution and ends with the violent overthrow of the old order. Thus in the Western revolution political mobilization is the consequence of the collapse of the old regime; in the Eastern revolution it is the cause of the collapse.⁴

Huntington thus sees as the distinguishing characteristic of an Eastern revolution a period of "dual power" in which the revolutionaries are expanding political participation and authority in contest with the government. They first do this in remote sections of the country where they struggle to win the support of the peasants. From this small, nonurban genesis, they will expand the scope of their authority and the level of their attacks until they defeat the central government's troops in battle.

Huntington sees the creation and mobilization of new social forces as being at the heart of revolution. He also sees two prerequisites for revolution: (1) existing political institutions that are incapable of providing participation for the new social forces; and (2) the desire of social forces, currently excluded, to participate in these institutions.⁵

He suggests that the reason both "real democracies" and Communist systems do not experience revolutions is because both have a capacity to absorb these new social forces. To him revolution involves the alienation of many groups (some urban, some rural) from the existing order, i.e., a multiple dysfunction in society. He later adds that the active participation of rural groups in the revolution is a *sine qua non* for success in the Eastern model. In short, there is no revolution without the peasantry.

The key question then becomes: What turns the peasants into revolutionaries? Huntington initially suggests that efforts to arouse the peasantry will fail unless the social and economic conditions of the peasants are such to give them concrete motives for revolt. In a later section on Leninism and political development, however, he acknowledges the efficacy of the Communist Party's efforts to mobilize the peasantry but adds that efforts by intellectuals to arouse peasants almost invariably fail unless the social and



economic conditions of the peasants are such as to give them concrete motives for revolt.⁶

Finally, in his model, a revolution results in the creation of a political community involving a "fundamental shift from a political culture in which subjects view the government as 'they' to one in which citizens view the government as 'we.'" To him, the most dramatic accomplishment is the fact that the masses which were previously excluded from the system now identify with it. He adds that, "this identity and sense of community legitimize the economic shortages and material burdens" which result from the disruption caused by the revolt.⁸

A second inevitable result of a revolution is the creation of new political structures which will institutionalize this expanded participation by the

social forces which produced the revolution. In short, Huntington argues the revolution requires the creation of a political party system with deep roots in the population.⁹ The political changes which occurred in southern Cambodia between 1970 and 1974 will be compared against this model of Eastern revolution.

HISTORY OF SOUTHERN CAMBODIA FROM 18 MARCH 1970 TO FEBRUARY 1974

This period can be usefully subdivided into the following three time frames, each of which witnessed a distinctly different phase of the revolutionary process.

- 18 March 1970 to mid-1971: In this period the combined Khmer Rouge and pro-Sihanouk forces formed the

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Khmer Liberation Front and moved to take control of parts of the countryside abandoned by the Phnom Penh government. The Front was still dominated and controlled by North Vietnam, and while there was some tightening of security regulations with their areas, the Front did not make an effort to carry out any revolutionary changes.

• Mid-1971 to Early 1973: This period saw the Khmer Rouge break away from Hanoi's control and embark on their own course. At the same time, they began disassociating themselves from the pro-Sihanouk elements in the Front, withdrew their allegiance to the Prince, and took the first steps in their program to change radically the nature of Khmer society. Distracted by the necessity to battle the Phnom Penh government's forces, this revolutionary program was, of necessity, limited. Cultural and social structures remained essentially intact but came under stiff attack through attempts to modify them.

Most of the programs described in the next section of this paper were carried out during this period.

• Early 1973 to February 1974: During this final period, the Khmer Communists drastically accelerated and intensified their program to radically alter society. Included in this effort were mass relocations of the population, purges of lenient cadres, the use of terror, and extensive remodeling of the economic system.

May 18, 1970 to Mid-1971. Prior to his fall on 18 March 1970, Prince Sihanouk headed a government which extended into most of the villages of the area and which provided certain administrative and educational services. The small insurgent movement¹⁰ opposing him consisted mainly of what was known as the Khmer Rouge, which existed entirely in jungle redoubts and which possessed none of the characteristics of an organized government. There

is general agreement that at this stage the Khmer Rouge was led by North Vietnamese trained cadres (known as Khmer Hanoi) and that the movement was an appendage of Ho Chi Minh's Indochinese Communist Party.¹¹

Following Lon Nol's ascent to power, pro-Sihanouk forces formed an alliance with the Khmer Rouge called the Khmer Liberation Front (Khmer Rumdoah) which we have come to know by its French acronym FUNK (Front Unifie Nationale de Kampuchea).

Because these two groups were the major actors in the battle against the Lon Nol government, it is important to state clearly the differences in their names, composition, and policies. The Khmer Rouge organization which is known in Cambodia as the Khmer Krahom (KK) (Krahom means red in Cambodian) is the Communist Party of Cambodia.* The pro-Sihanouk forces and cadres were called Khmer Rumdoah (KR) (Khmer Liberators), the exact same name that was used to identify the united liberation front comprised of both groups. As some confusion on this point is inevitable, for the sake of clarity, the following terms will be used exclusively to identify the main actors in the anti-Lon Nol movement.

- Khmer Krahom (KK), the Communist Party (Khmer Rouge) element.
- Khmer Rumdoah (KR), the pro-Sihanouk elements within the FUNK.
- FUNK, the formal front organization comprised of both groups which in Cambodian is called Khmer Rumdoah.

While they agreed on their opposition to the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, it eventually became clear that the KK and the KR disagreed on practically everything else. The

*Care should be taken not to confuse this with Khmer Krom (Cambodian for under) which refers in general to Cambodian living down below in Vietnam, and in particular to armed bands of ethnic Khmers who roamed the Mekong Delta in the 1950's and 1960's.

following significant differences, clearly emerged from interviews with refugees and former KK cadres:

1. The Khmer Krahom were Communists who sought to bring about a peasants' revolution which would lead to the establishment of a Communist state directed by a central party committee. The Khmer Rumdoah were royalists whose goal was to restore Prince Sihanouk to power and to re-establish the traditional society of the pre-Lon Nol period.

2: The KK policy was to repress the Buddhist Church and usurp its position of authority in Khmer society. The KR respected religion and desired to maintain it in its traditional position of preeminence.

3. The KK policy was to confiscate land and collectivize agriculture. The KR wished to retain traditional land holdings.

4. The KK were strongly anti-Vietnamese and desired to force all Vietcong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units out of Cambodia. The KR, on the other hand, were in favor of full cooperation with the VC/NVA.

These differences were not so clear when the FUNK first claimed power in much of the countryside near the South Vietnam border. In fact, from the inception of FUNK control until mid-1971, nothing approaching Huntington's definition of a revolution had taken place. No violent or radical change in the political culture of the villages occurred. Rather, there simply was a transfer of power or, as occurred in many cases, the FUNK filled a vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Lon Nol army (Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres, or FANK), and the remnants of the civilian government from many villages and hamlets went back to the district and province towns. FUNK cadres simply moved into these villages and hamlets and established a new local government which at least in some cases

was elected.* This government was known as the Royal United National Front Government of Kampuchea which we have usually called GRUNK. During this period, life apparently did not change radically in the villages, probably because of the continued domination and management of FUNK by the North Vietnamese. Refugees stated that while certain new rules and political institutions were introduced during this period (such as travel restrictions and farmers and youth associations), traditional land holdings, customs, and religious practices went unchanged.¹³ They also noted the presence of North Vietnamese troops in many hamlets and villages during this period.

The argument that Hanoi controlled FUNK during this period is reinforced by Brown who states that Communist directives captured in Cambodia in May and June of 1970 contained detailed

*Brown quotes captured North Vietnamese documents as ordering FUNK cadres to organize village and hamlet elections in which people of prestige were to be elected at a mass meeting by a show of hands.¹²

From everything stated by refugees, it appears that such elections were open and honest. The first such elections as described by the village chief of Russei Srok Village occurred in Kampong Trach District of Kampot Province in late May 1970 shortly after the departure of FANK troops. In each village an assembly was first called and chaired by three FUNK cadres from the district administration who announced the establishment of a new government which would be constituted through elections. They then called for volunteers to run for the post of village chairman, and a secret ballot election was immediately held with each villager casting a single vote. The candidate with a plurality won. All of the candidates were local residents and none were members of the FUNK or KK. The newly elected village chief was empowered to select the remainder of his staff: a deputy, secretary, economic commissioner, cultural commissioner, and health and social welfare commissioner. This election process was repeated at the hamlet level to elect a chairman, who, in turn, appointed a deputy and economic commissioner.

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instructions for Vietnamese cadres to use when "liberating" a Cambodian village.¹⁴ They were to stress to villagers the themes of loyalty to Prince Sihanouk, protection of life, property, and Khmer culture; to organize villagers into liberation associations; to organize elections; to collect taxes; and to maintain security. From this evidence it seems safe to conclude that policies dictated by North Vietnamese guidelines were in fact being carried out in this part of Cambodia during this period. While these directives provide for strong control of a village once liberated, there were no instructions to carry out a revolution in Huntington's sense of the word, and all evidence suggests that none occurred.

Late 1971 to 1973. Sometime in mid-1971 three important events took place:

- The KK broke away from domination by the North Vietnamese;
- The KK gained control of the FUNK, dropped its allegiance to Sihanouk and purged KR cadres; and
- The KK began their program to change radically Cambodian society, the main theme of which was that Cambodia was to go through a total social revolution and everything that had preceded it was anathema and must be destroyed.

From interviews with refugees and former GRUNK village officials, it is clear that these three changes took place in conjunction with a change in the KK leadership. It is in this period that new "tougher" KK cadres appeared on the scene and began to implement new policies and programs. It is also in this period that the first serious differences between Cambodian Liberation Army (CLA) forces and Vietnamese Communist troops broke out, probably reflecting a high-level decision to formally break away from Hanoi. From this point on, in fact, KK cadres actively propagandized against North Vietnam

and stressed themes such as "self-reliance" and "Cambodians for Cambodians."^{15*}

In breaking with Sihanouk, the KK also did away with FUNK. They now openly called themselves the Khmer Krahom and no longer used the term Khmer Rumdoah. In addition, they sought to destroy all the vestiges of, and references to, the old royal society. Immediately at the local level they dropped the term "Royal" (Reach) from the title of their opposition government and replaced it with the word "Kana" (which means sect, party, or committee) making the new title of the government in the areas they controlled "Kana Rothaphibal Ronasey Ruoprumchet Kampuchea" (or the "Party Government of the United National Front").^{15**} They also embarked on a campaign to eliminate symbols of the old regime and to that end destroyed most of the schools and governmental offices built in the villages by the Sihanouk government.¹⁶ They also changed the names and terms of reference of province and district governments. For instance, the word which both the Sihanouk and Lon Nol governments used for province—"Khet"—was replaced by the word "Dumbon," which means area or sector. Not satisfied with a change in mere terms of

*This break with Sihanouk and Hanoi produced the curious situation of North Vietnamese Communist troops propagandizing on the Prince's behalf in Cambodia during 1972 and part of 1973 in opposition to the Khmer Krahom who were denouncing him.

**While making this change at the local level, the KK did not destroy the facade of the FUNK at the national or international level. Therefore, references to the "Royal" Government continued at this higher level and Sihanouk continued to be acknowledged as Chief of State. For the sake of clarity, the governmental structure which was established will continue to be referred to as GRUNK in the remainder of the paper, even though it could be argued it should be called GPUNK.

reference, the KK also eliminated the proper names of all provinces and districts and substituted numbers for them. Thus, Kampot Province (Khet Kampot) became Area 35 (Dumbon 35), Takeo became Area 13, and Kandal was called Area 25. Districts went through the same process; for example, Kampong Trach District was changed to District 77. Interestingly, the words for hamlet, village, and district (phum, khum, and srok), were not changed nor the proper names of any village or hamlet.^{17*} It is emphasized that these numbers were not just part of an internal code for secret or official use but became the proper name by which all citizens were told to refer to these administrative divisions.

In addition to destroying the old, the KK began implementing their new programs. They started a land reform program, set up cooperative stores, partially collectivized agriculture, and outlawed certain social customs and practices. While the KK were able to devote some attention to these new programs, their main effort during this period was a military effort to eliminate the FANK. Thus this second period was characterized by a tightening of political control and the beginning of the process of changing political values, myths, and institutions but not total revolution.

Early 1973 to February 1974. In the spring of 1973, the KK opened a final offensive designed at eliminating all FANK military presence in the area by attacking villages and outposts. In many instances, the KK, having overrun a FANK position, proceeded intentionally to burn down some or all of the private houses, forcing the residents to flee. It was during this period that approximately 15,000 Cambodians sought

refuge in Vietnam. The KK continued this pressure through April and into May when they finally forced the FANK to abandon its last position, thus effectively ending any meaningful Phnom Penh government presence in southern Kampot, Takeo, and Kandal Provinces. Southern Prey Veng and Svay Rieng had been captured as well.

With FANK effectively out of the way, the KK in May of 1973 began an intensive effort aimed at fully discrediting Sihanouk, driving all Vietnamese out of Cambodia, and accelerating the radical change of society which they had begun in late 1971. Included in this latter process were their programs of psychological reorientation, mass relocations, total collectivization of agriculture, the elimination of religion, and restructuring social customs.*

The new anti-Sihanouk campaign was more virulent than the KK effort in 1972, which had mainly featured polemics and some reshuffling of pro-Sihanouk cadres out of positions of power. The campaign began in early 1973 when the KK reportedly began an in-depth purge of ex-Sihanouk loyalists and cadres in eastern Kampot Province. This campaign was reportedly aimed at anyone who had served in the Sihanouk government, even those prior to the 1970 coup, including village chiefs, minor functionaries, and even village guards.¹⁸ At the same time, the KK kept up their propaganda effort against the Prince, accusing him of living well in

*At first only people living near the South Vietnamese border were relocated, leading observers to believe that the purpose of the burning of complete villages and the forced mass movements of people was to frustrate efforts of North Vietnamese cadres to influence the population and to allow a better control of cross-border trade. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that these acts were the precursors of the mass evacuation of Phnom Penh, both of which had as their basic function the total uprooting of individuals from their previous traditions, customs, and institutions.

*There are seven levels of governmental and party authority in Communist Cambodia: central, regional, province, district, village, hamlet, and interfamily group.

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Peking while the people suffered, staying outside Cambodia too long, and supporting "the hated" Vietnamese.¹⁹

In Svay Rieng Province, according to Government of Vietnam officials and intelligence sources, the KK also tried to disassociate themselves from Sihanouk but ran into difficulties. Around the end of 1972, the KK began publicly disavowing the Prince's leadership, saying that he had "deserted the revolution" and "was taking 100,000 *riels* a month from the party's coffers to live a fast life in Peking, while the people were left to fight and die in Cambodia." Propaganda teams were sent to villages to spread this message and proclaim the party supreme, but this provoked some spontaneous demonstrations by the populace on Sihanouk's behalf. The KK quickly changed their approach; they declared that, although Sihanouk had committed some errors, he had apologized to the people and the party and so was again leader of the antigovernment forces. However, the KK cadres also added that when Sihanouk returned, it would be as a private citizen and not as a Prince. Privately, however, the KK did not recognize Sihanouk's authority and stated they were just using his popularity to placate the population. According to reports, as much was openly stated at meetings of KK cadres. At party headquarters, all references to, and pictures of, the Prince were forbidden.

These continued verbal attacks on Sihanouk and the KK policies of relocating large segments of the population and the collectivization of agriculture greatly increased friction between the KK and those members of the rank and file who were basically KR. This was especially true within the military where the great majority were not KK, and it eventually led to fighting between the two factions. The first such outbreak occurred on 6 November 1973 in two hamlets of Kampong Trach District. In two nearly identical incidents, KK and KR members of the same military

units opened fire on each other. Both fights resulted from KR opposition to the KK plan to relocate forcibly the population. Two weeks later inter-faction fighting broke out again in Kampot, this time at Banteay Meas Hamlet when KK cadres and soldiers came to control the rice harvest. The local residents and KR cadres refused to go along with the KK plan for a collectivized harvest. They were incensed, too, over the KK's reference to Sihanouk as an "imperialist leading a feudal regime." The local KR then rallied about 500 villagers to come to their aid and, armed with scythes, machetes, and hatchets, drove off the KK. A few weeks later, on 6 December, another such clash took place near Tuk Meas.²⁰

By February of 1974, FUNK, composed of the Khmer Krahom and the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdoah, had broken down in southern Cambodia with the KK emerging as the dominant force. This breakdown was due to a conscious and deliberate KK effort to disassociate themselves from Sihanouk, undermine his popular legitimacy, and to purge Sihanouk cadres from positions of power. At the same time, the KK were implementing their program for a radical formation of Khmer society.

KHMER KRAHOM REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM OF COMMUNIZATION

The communization process did not occur at a uniform rate throughout the entire border area. It was usually directly related to the length of time the KK had controlled a village. Programs in villages the KK had controlled since mid-1970, such as those in Kampot, were much further along than those in Takeo and Kandal which the KK succeeded in taking over only in 1973. The KK communization process itself can be broken down into the following categories: Political-Psychological; Socio-

Religious-Cultural; Economic; Military; and Governmental-Administrative.

Prior to discussing the specifics of each KK program, it is important to point out the distinction between villages which had been relocated and those that had not. Relocation, as the name implies, involved a total uprooting of the community and physically moving it to a new location. In the process, all vestiges of the past, including religion and private property, were left behind. Such moves provided a total break with the past. While some initial relocations began in Kampot in 1972, it was not until mid-1973 that the program was begun on a large scale. It was preceded by a purge of many lower level cadres, especially those known as Khmer Hanoi, and their replacement by tough, young militant cadres who had never been seen before.²¹ Reports from these new relocated villages were few and details were sketchy. From statements made by several different refugees, the following general picture emerged. Each new site is populated by about 200 people, all of whom live together in a large single shelter. All land is worked in common. No land is privately owned and no one keeps anything he produces. The hours of work are extremely long and are followed by nighttime indoctrination sessions. No dissent from existing policies is allowed, and anyone objecting is arrested or killed. There is no religion allowed in the new sites, and all monks are defrocked and ordered to work. Old customs, songs, and mode of dress are forbidden, along with the possession of any ostentatious property.²²

Unrelocated villages, on the other hand, went through a more gradual period of change between 1971 and 1973. During this period, it became clear that KK policies and programs were aimed at a genuine social revolution, but they appeared to be geared to a period of several years. In these villages, organized religion still existed

as did certain customs and practices.²³

Most of the programs described in the following section took place in unrelocated villages. As each program is described, it will be noted whether it usually occurred in an unrelocated village, a relocated one, or in both.

Political-Psychological. The KK programs designed to mobilize the population and to mold individuals into "productive" members of society are: membership in people's associations; mass propaganda meetings; intensive training; reeducation through work and reeducation through confinement; and terror. It is believed that the KK set up a standard of evaluating the degree to which certain communities have been indoctrinated. Under this rating system, people who had just come under KK control and who had had little political training were called *Sa Dan*, while those who had been receiving propaganda and training regularly for over a year were referred to as *Bet Tra Lop*.²⁴ Based on statements by refugees, it appears that at first in the newly "liberated" areas the KK dealt with the population much less strictly than after a year of control.

The KK organized villagers according to sex, age, and occupation. The standard pattern seemed to be for every village to have a: children's association; women's association; married men's association; and farmers' association. KK associations have a three-man command structure: chairman, deputy, and committeeman. The chairman is elected.²⁵ The purposes of these organizations varied. The children's association seemed to be mainly a study and play club which in some locales was called the Patriotic Youth Movement. All other associations engaged in more practical activities, with some of them having their own communal ricefields and garden plots. In some villages the associations were called upon to help guard the hamlets. People's associations were also involved in fund and food

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raising campaigns and had an important role to play in the intensive training program.

Although these associations had certain functions to perform, it must be emphasized they were not within the KK administrative chain of command (which goes through the hamlet chief and interfamily group chief) and they were not used in the implementation of important programs. For example, when the KK sought to organize and conduct "popular demonstrations" against the VC/NVA in Kampong Trach District, the population was mobilized and brought to the demonstration area through orders given through the hamlet and interfamily group chiefs and not the people's associations.²⁶ Also, the KK employed this same chain of command to collectivize agriculture and to relocate large segments of the population—two of their most important programs. Thus, the associations seem to have had primarily a political and psychological role and not an administrative one.

The KK used propaganda sessions and nocturnal assemblies to achieve political and psychological aims. The most prevalent form of indoctrination was the night propaganda session, of which two types were discerned. The first type was a village assembly to which every family had to send one representative. This type was usually found in *Bet Tra Lop* villages. This meeting's two main purposes seem to have been to inform the population about KK policies and programs and to answer questions about them. In Kampong Trach, where the KK had control for 3 years, such meetings were held twice each month, but attendance was usually limited to those families who lived near the village center. (Obviously, this type of session took place in unrelocated areas.) In villages considered *Sa Dan* and in all relocated villages, reports indicate that the entire village had to attend lectures on such basic subjects as the principles of Communist

doctrine, people's war, and increased farm production.²⁷

The second type of nighttime meeting was somewhat more complex and involved the participation of the people's associations. Essentially, it was a response to a call for support for the army or for families of KK soldiers and involved donations of food and/or money. In some places it was called the Family Support Movement and in others the ceremony to "Uplift Your Spirit to Support the Committee" (*Smaraday Phnak Rolek Upathon Anghar*). For this latter type of meeting, a drive would typically begin several days before the ceremony when the village chairman would receive an order from the district leader to raise food and money. He would then contact the chairmen of the associations who, in turn, would hold meetings of their respective associations to settle the details of obtaining the needed commodities. Finally, a nighttime pageantlike ceremony was held, at a pagoda, at which each member of each association would come forth and present his contribution. These were usually styled as happy events with large numbers of children present and much singing of "revolutionary" songs.^{28*}

One of the main targets of the political-psychological KK efforts was youth. The KK began a program of intensive political training for young men and women which involved taking them from their home hamlets to remote indoctrination centers for a period of 2 to 3 weeks. While there is no information about the nature and content of this training, it seems to have achieved significant results. According to all accounts, youths (age 16-18)

*This type of ceremony occurred only in unrelocated villages and prior to 1973. The fact that such ceremonies were often held in pagodas should not be overlooked, since this was probably an intentional effort to merge state functions with religion.

returning from these sessions were fierce in their condemnation of religion and the "old ways"; rejected parental authority; were passionate in their loyalty to the state and party; were critical and contemptuous of customs; and had a militant attitude which expressed confidence in mechanical weapons and rejected the mystical aspects of religion.²⁹ In Kampong Trach, these youths stopped working on their family plot of land and instead worked directly for the youth association on its land.³⁰ The association thus seemed to become a new point of identification for the youth, at least partially replacing the family. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the KK process of psychologically restructuring Khmer society included a major attack on the family, one of the major elements of traditional Cambodian society.

Another part of the popular mobilization process was reeducation through work. The KK sought to mold and reshape Khmer society through reeducation of specific individuals. This process seemed to be used to "socially level" certain persons who had been members of the bourgeois class under the previous regime. For instance, in Kampot, a university student was forced to plant and harvest rice. In another case, a wealthy woman had all her property confiscated and she was forced to tend the pigs in her commune. In Kandal Province, everyone, regardless of previous work experience, was assigned tasks within a local agricultural commune. KK cadres there explained that this was done to reeducate each individual as to his role as a member of society and to obliterate any class lines.³¹

There also was reeducation for those who needed to be socially readjusted which involved a system of confinement and hard labor. The types and degrees of punishment will be described in a section below.

The final KK method for cowing and

molding the population was terror. Reports of harsh punishment were widespread. Refugees said death sentences were relatively common although public executions were not. Usually people were arrested and simply never showed up again.³² Some specific examples of this are:

- "Many" people in the Kampot area had "vanished during the night" after questioning certain aspects of the KK forced relocation program. They were never seen again.³³

- The Russei Strok village chief said six rich but innocent persons in his village were accused of being FANK spies, arrested, and taken to the Kampot Province jail where they either died of malaria or were executed. He also said that some people who sold cows in defiance of a KK order were sent to this jail and have not been seen again.

- Intelligence reports stated that anyone opposing KK rice confiscation in Svay Rieng Province was tortured and that anyone fleeing KK areas was shot on the spot.

- In Cham hamlets of Kandal Province, interfamily group chairmen were told they would be shot if anyone from their group turned up missing.³⁴

In other instances, punishments have not been quite so harsh. One Cham religious leader who questioned a KK directive regulating Cham women's hair styles received only 3 months in a district jail. Other Chams who continued to wear their customary colorful clothing despite a KK ban had their clothing painted black, if it was a first offense. For a second offense, the penalty was 3 days loss of food ration, and for a third time, 3 months in jail.³⁵

Fear, then, seems obviously a key ingredient both in insuring the smooth operation of the KK government and in controlling the population. Refugees at Tinh Bien as well as Cham refugees in Chau Doc City stated that fear of arrest and execution was so great that no one dared speak critically of a KK policy—

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even in his own home—lest he be overheard and turned in by a neighbor.

Socio-Religious-Cultural. The KK also instituted a series of policies in unrelocated villages, which were aimed at the reformation of religion, marriage, and certain customs and mores. The KK attempted to change marriage in two ways: by raising the minimum age and by removing much of the pomp surrounding the wedding ceremony. In both Kandal and Kampot Provinces the minimum marriage age was raised to 25 for a male and 21 for female. In Kampot, the KK explained that scientific research has shown that marriage prior to this age is unhealthy. In Kandal, the KK used the more pragmatic explanation that all efforts should be devoted to the war and, therefore, all marriages will have to wait until it is over. The KK had forbidden the holding of elaborate wedding pageants and ceremonies which were the Cambodian and Cham custom.^{3 6}

The KK also undertook to limit the numbers of holidays, holy days, and ceremonies and change their character by forbidding traditional dances and by rewriting popular and folk songs. All of this was decreed and implemented through the system of cultural committees of the province, district, and village governments.^{3 7} No ceremony of any type could be held in any part of a village without the prior approval of the cultural committee. Traditional dancing was totally forbidden, along with singing of religious and folk songs. The cultural committee replaced them with new revolutionary songs, which were sung only at such appropriate events as night propaganda sessions and "Uplift Your Spirit . . ." ceremonies. Holy days and holidays were reduced to only two—Cambodian New Year and Pchum Band. The manner of celebration was also changed. Whereas previously these occasions called for houses to be colorfully decorated throughout every

hamlet, now only one central celebration was allowed in each village, usually at the pagoda. Religious and national festivals of ethnic and religious minorities were totally forbidden, and their former participants were forced to attend two Cambodian celebrations, New Year and Pchum Band. Buddhist religious ceremonies were also forbidden, although pagodas were not closed to individual use in unrelocated villages.^{3 8}

Perhaps the most significant socio-cultural reformation the KK attempted in unrelocated villages was an attack on religion in general and the Theravada Buddhist Church and clergy in particular. Some aspects of this policy have been the program for intensive political training for youth which reportedly instilled in them a disdain for things religious; the prohibition against practically all religious ceremonies; the conduct of civil and political meetings and celebrations in religious edifices; a ban on traditional dancing and religious songs; and the prohibition of the practice of the Islamic religion.

The major part of the KK program to reform religion, however, was aimed at undercutting the influence and authority of the clergy of the Buddhist Church—the monks—by means of several specific measures: setting up a government-controlled monks' association, forcing the monks to perform manual labor, inducting them into the army, stripping them of their robes and honorific titles, arresting uncooperative monks and sending them for re-education, and replacing old chief monks with new ones sympathetic to KK aims.^{3 9 *}

This attack on the monks began in May 1973, and it was initially limited to forcing the monks to perform manual labor so they would be "productive members of the community earning

*Of course, in relocated villages the attack was complete and involved the total destruction of the religion.

their way."⁴⁰ In other cases, monks were forced to shed their robes and form labor gangs to work on road projects.⁴¹ A general prohibition against addressing monks by their honorific title was also put into effect. Despite KK propaganda on equality, this policy met with resistance not only from the monks themselves but also from the population.⁴²

In order to overcome this resistance, the KK in June 1973 undertook the establishment of a KK-controlled monks' association and the forced re-education of a large number of monks. The monks' associations, headed by new young monks, replaced the traditional religious Sangha organization led by elderly monks.⁴³ Each pagoda was also reorganized into an association with an elected chairman and deputy—reportedly carefully screened by the KK before being allowed to stand for election—with remaining monks divided up into three-man cells.⁴⁴ The new chief monk then visited each association (pagoda) explaining the new regime. He outlined the following duties for each monk: explain the KK revolution and objectives through lectures to the population and urge support for them, assist at all hamlet level propaganda activities, assist in relocating villages, help collect money, and serve in the army if required.⁴⁵ Many monks reacted against these policies, and in July 1973, when the first letter came out requiring each pagoda to supply 10 monks for the army, a number of older monks encouraged their younger draft-age colleagues to flee to South Vietnam. To defeat this opposition, the KK established a reeducation center in September at Sre Chea near Kampong Trach and brought 200 recalcitrant monks there for training. The monks were told that if they agreed to support the KK and follow party instructions, they would be allowed to return to their pagodas. Some of the monks adamantly refused to go along with the

KK and were detained indefinitely.⁴⁶

At the same time they were implementing this program, the KK began inducting monks into the army on a large scale in Kampot and Takeo Provinces. Each pagoda was allowed to keep four monks and the rest had to join the army.⁴⁷ Many monks fled, but most did not escape. By September 1973 there were only a few monks left in each pagoda.

In summary, by the end of 1973 the KK had made significant progress in its attack on religion. It had sharply limited the number of holy days, changed religious celebrations to fit civil needs, outlawed religious song and dance, prohibited practice of the Islamic religion, reduced the number of monks in Kampot and Takeo Provinces, reduced their presence in pagodas to a minimal number, and undermined the traditional system of monastic authority by establishing a new monks' association.

A final KK social reform has been a forced austerity program. The prohibition against colorful dress was applied to Cambodians and Cham. Beginning in mid-1972, ethnic Khmers had been forbidden to wear the traditional multicolored sarong in Kampot and Takeo Provinces. Also forbidden was the wearing of elaborate veils, unusual hairdos, and all types of costume jewelry.⁴⁸ Instead, everyone was supposed to wear plain black shirts and trousers and let the hair fall naturally. This latter requirement was particularly bothersome to Cham women who traditionally wore their hair up.

Another austerity measure has been a ban on drinking commercial alcohol or beer and smoking manufactured cigarettes.⁴⁹ Locally made palm wine and roll-your-own tobacco and papers were still available in 1973.⁵⁰

Economic Reform. Another major way in which the KK have sought to reshape Khmer society has been the

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communization and collectivization of the economy. This has involved the following programs: land redistribution, establishment of cooperative stores, strict regulation of trading and commercial activity, collectivized harvests, mass relocations of the population, economic leveling, common ownership of the agricultural means of production, and communization of the distribution process.

The KK program of economic leveling—reducing the amount of material possessions of some so that all citizens have roughly the same degree of wealth—was one of the first steps the KK took when they gained control of a village. Besides prohibiting fancy dress and the wearing of jewelry, another and a major part of the process was the confiscation of mechanized transportation, Hondas and motorized sampans. In Kampong Trach these items were simply expropriated by the district government, though the cadres did tell owners their boats were just being borrowed and, in fact, did return a few to their owners.⁵¹ In Kandal Province this same process was accomplished through a system of confiscatory taxation.

A more encompassing confiscation of valuable material goods took place during the mass relocation of villages and hamlets. In these instances people were allowed only to take a few necessities, and usually they were forced to abandon their houses, furniture, and family heirlooms which KK cadres then collected.⁵² In some cases, some household goods were not taken. In Kampong Trach District, for instance, people had to abandon their houses but could take with them any possessions they could carry.⁵³

Land redistribution was also one of the first programs the KK initiated after they entered a village. It seemed designed to act as an immediate initiation into the new system and as a preparation for the future programs of collectivization and communization

of agriculture. While some type of land reform occurred in all the provinces, the methods have differed slightly. In Kampong Trach, where the program was carried out in all villages in 1972, no person was allowed to retain over 5 hectares of riceland or 1 hectare of garden land. Riceland over that limit was given to people with fewer than 5 hectares or to people's associations in the village. Orchards and garden land were not redistributed, instead they were kept under district government control.⁵⁴ In Kandal, where riceland is less abundant, all land was confiscated and then parceled out, with each family getting 1 hectare.⁵⁵ A partial collectivization policy accompanied this land reform program.

There are two systems of collectivization. In the first system, which appears to be an introductory step toward total communization, families retain individual responsibility (ownership?) for planting and caring for a particular piece of riceland, but they harvest collectively.* This procedure was put into effect simultaneously with the land redistribution program in Kampong Trach District and Kandal Province. Under this arrangement, each family was responsible for buying seed, plowing, planting, hoeing, and weeding its own tract. However, at harvest time, all members of the interfamily group formed a joint crew which moved from plot to plot cutting, threshing, and collecting rice which was then moved to a central storage point, usually at the home of the interfamily group chairman. Once the harvest was completed, the distribution of rice to each family was based on a formula which allowed each person an equal amount of rice per day. Enough

*It was never possible to determine whether the land reform program bestowed rights of ownership or property to recipients or just responsibility for caring for state property. The impression received was that families still believed they owned the land.

rice was to be retained to feed everyone in the group until the next harvest and the remainder sold to the village government, which forwarded it to the district for use by the army or to feed other groups whose harvest was insufficient. Money made by any interfamily group from the sale of excess rice was kept by the chairman to pay for any special needs of the group or any member, such as special medicine or certain types of farm equipment.⁵⁶

The second type of collectivization was found in relocated villages. In this system, land is held in common by the interfamily group and families do not have responsibility for any particular section of it. The entire process of rice production is done in common, from plowing to harvest. Distribution remains the same as in the first system. In these communes, the KK introduced new farming methods to the people such as the use of fertilizer and insecticides and techniques for building bigger and more effective dikes.⁵⁷ As a result, production has outstripped previous individual efforts.

In unrelocated villages, other farm activities were brought under strict regulation but were not collectivized. Individual families were still allowed to own chickens, pigs, cattle, and other livestock but could not freely dispose of them. Cattle, water buffalo, and other large animals could be killed and sold only with permission of the district government and then only to one of the district cooperative stores.⁵⁸ Chickens, pigs, ducks, and other smaller animals could be slaughtered without permission and sold either in one's own village market or to the district cooperative, but nowhere else. This prohibition was enforced through a system of permits. Anyone wishing to move livestock or any commodity to a cooperative had to have a paper issued by his village chairman listing the items he was allowed to buy and sell. Roving bands of local militia insured compliance.⁵⁹

The KK moved to gain complete control of trade both within their society and with areas outside it. Their main tools were strict regulation of all movement into, out of, and inside their areas and the establishment of cooperative stores which handle all major commercial transactions and all imports and exports. These cooperatives were first established in Kampong Trach District in 1972 and are the only authorized agents with whom outsiders can deal.⁶⁰ To insure their success, all residents of KK areas were forced to buy and sell certain restricted items only at these stores. It is important to note that the cooperative stores did not replace the traditional local market in each village and hamlet, but rather served as a subdistrict trading post at which goods from the outside could be bought and goods for the outside sold. In Kampong Trach District, for example, there were four cooperative stores to serve the six widely separated villages.⁶¹ There was also a co-op in Kaoh Thom District which served all of southern Kandal Province⁶² and several in nearby Svay Rieng Province.⁶³ The cooperatives sold local surplus agricultural products such as rice, corn, green beans, peppercorns, and potatoes as well as pigs, chickens, and cattle to outside buyers. In return they imported kerosene, medicine, black cloth, farm implements, and salt for local sale and also gasoline and medicine for military use.

These stores reportedly brought the KK a large profit. The cooperative store bought all local produce at a low price (usually less than one-half the price paid at unrestricted border markets) and then sold it at a high rate to merchants from South Vietnam. The KK was able to do this because, in both cases, it enjoyed a monopoly. To protect it, the KK forbade the sale of certain products except in limited amounts at local markets for consumption within areas they controlled. Faced with a surplus and no other place to sell, local

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farmers were forced to deal with the co-ops.⁶⁴

Having cut off trade between residents of its areas and the outside, the KK then worked to reestablish these trade lines through their cooperative stores. For instance, it was reported that the co-op in southern Kandal Province did a 3 million piaster a week trade with a consortium of businessmen from Chau Doc Province. The KK exported cattle, sugar cane, vegetables, pigs, and fruit and in return received payment in the form of drafts on Phnom Penh banks and/or medicine, kerosene, salt, farm tools, and cotton and nylon cloth.^{65*} In Kampot Province, the KK had a cooperative representative at the Lok Market to insure a steady and exclusive flow of important goods from Ha Tien.

Military and Para-Military Organizations. The KK greatly expanded the participation by the populace in military and paramilitary units and used these vehicles as a device to control movement and carry out political indoctrination.

Military or paramilitary units were organized and controlled at the hamlet, village, district, and area (province) levels of government. At area level, the army was organized into battalions (konverea) and special companies. These were full-time local force units which were thoroughly trained and had first priority on available equipment and weaponry. Their main mission was to conduct operations against FANK units.

The status of district level units was less clear. These troops were directly

controlled by the Deputy District Chairman for Military and Political Affairs, whose role will be discussed further, and seemed to have as their mission defending the district from outside attack, protecting the district office and district officials, controlling the population, and enforcing unpopular political decisions. As an example of the latter, it was these district units which supported the KK relocation program by coming to each hamlet and forcing people to pack up and move.⁶⁶

At the village level, there was a permanent force of about 12 to 15 men who were directly under the command of the deputy village chairman and whose mission was to: provide security for the village office and village officials, control movement by the population, provide security against outside attack, and support police operations.⁶⁷

Below the village level, there was a hamlet militia which was armed in some cases and not armed in others.* All boys from age 16 (in some areas 14) were required to join the militia and undergo basic training. In some areas girls were also required to join this force and stand guard.⁶⁸ In hamlets where weapons were issued, a more permanent unit of 12 was established. In this case, the remainder of the hamlet youth formed a ready reserve from which replacements could be drawn. Adults were also involved, but to a lesser degree, which emphasized the previously stated KK policy of practical indoctrination of youth. In addition, the KK conducted a series of night training sessions for everyone in the hamlet during which the principles of people's war and duties of individual citizens were explained.⁶⁹

*Another example of this effort to establish exclusive trade occurred in late December 1973 when the KK in Takeo Province sent a message to authorities in Chau Doc proposing a mutual easing of border restrictions and establishment of trading relations between the two areas. Recent reports by journalists in Thailand indicate that there is now trade going on between Thai merchants and KK representatives.

*Apparently the distinction discussed earlier between *Sa Dan* villages and *Bet Tra Lop*, ones applied in regard to military matters as well, although it was not determined if the same word applied. More advanced hamlets were more trusted and given weapons, indicating they had advanced to a certain degree.

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Participation in the village militia contributed in some cases to the KK attack on customs and traditional authority. In several Cham villages, young girls were forced to leave their homes and perform work as security guards. This was in direct violation of the Cham tradition that unmarried girls must be kept cloistered at home from the time they reach puberty until marriage.⁷⁰

Buddhist traditions were also attacked in this manner. Monks were also forced to leave pagodas, shed their robes, and join military units in direct violation of their religious vows.⁷¹

Governmental-Administrative and Political System. Now that the KK program to revolutionize the countryside has been described, the question that comes to mind is: How did such a small group of people carry out such a varied and all-encompassing effort?

There is little, if any, evidence to suggest that the majority of the population supported or favored this program. In fact, the opposite seems true:

- There was significant opposition to the KK attacks on Prince Sihanouk and religion.

- There was armed resistance to KK attempts to collectivize the harvest.

- At least 28,000 people fled from southern Cambodia alone into South Vietnam, and an estimated 20-25,000 others fled to FANK controlled areas.*

- All relocations of villages and hamlets were carried out under duress and the threat of violence and not willingly by the people.

- Almost all refugees stated that people were unhappy living under the new programs and policies of the KK.

There is, however, substantial evidence which indicates that the KK were able to carry out their programs for several reasons: they had a well organized, highly disciplined organization; they strictly limited movement by the population; they cowed people and suppressed dissent and opposition through

harsh and brutal punishments; and they constructed a governmental apparatus at the village and hamlet level which allowed them to exercise tight control over every family in the area.

Their success is all the more amazing when it is realized that they had few, if any, cadres at the village or hamlet level. The Russei Srok village chief, for instance, claimed that there were no KK cadres in his village at all. He said party cadres could only be found at the district level or above. There is some evidence which suggests that some villages did have party cadres in them, but these were in a distinct minority.


There are seven levels of government within the KK government: central; military region; area; district; village; hamlet; and interfamily group. There are three KK military regions in the area of this study: MR 405, MR 607 and MR 203. MR 405 includes Takeo and Kampot Provinces; MR 607 includes Kandal Province; and MR 203 includes Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces. These military regions are subdivided into KK areas (provinces) which have numbers instead of names. Kampot Province is known as Area 35, Takeo Province is Area 13, Kandal Province is Area 25, Prey Veng Province is Area 24 and Svay Rieng Province is Area 23. Each area is

*These are the USAID refugee figures on the number of refugees from Cambodia in camps in South Vietnam in 1973. Actually, there were many more refugees who never entered camps and lived with relatives or friends. In Chau Doc, for instance, it was estimated that there were at least 10,000 additional people.

Admittedly some of these people originally fled to avoid the fighting. However, long after the FANK had been completely driven from the area, the refugee camps in Vietnam were still full. The stories which reached the camps with the second group of refugees apparently convinced them not to leave.

Such flights from KK control were not limited to the southern border area. In Kampong Thom Province, 45,000 people fled a KK area *en masse* in one of the more celebrated events of the war.

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comprised of districts, which also have numerical designations.

Below the district level of government are found the village and hamlet governments—which have retained their traditional names—and the newly instituted interfamily groups.

Tables of organization indicating most of the probable positions at each level of government are set forth in the appendix.

As stated above, district governments were established by the FUNK right after it was formed in March 1970. They then organized village and hamlet elections. All of the candidates for these elections were local residents, and none were members of the KK. The newly elected village chiefs were empowered to select the remainder of their staffs: a deputy, secretary, economic commissioner, cultural commissioner, and

health and social welfare commissioner.⁷²

The election process at the hamlet level also elects a chairman, who, in turn, appoints a deputy and economic commissioner. Each hamlet also maintains a 12-man military unit as does the village, in addition to a two-man police force.⁷³ This represents the total staff of the village and the hamlet, all of which is under the authority of the chairman.⁷⁴ In most cases, there was no separate party existence nor were there political cadres at the village level or at any level below. Other reports, however, indicated that in 1973, after the KK had entered their accelerated communization campaign, village and hamlet officials were appointed by district level officials usually from a group of low-level KK cadres.⁷⁵

The lowest level of government was

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that of the interfamily group, which comprised from 12 to 15 families headed by a group chairman picked by the hamlet chief. Each group had a deputy and one committeeman. The interfamily group, as noted previously, was one of the KK's most important means of carrying out its programs. For example, when the KK sought to organize and conduct "popular demonstrations" against the Vietnamese in Kampong Trach District, the population was mobilized and brought to the demonstration area through orders given through the hamlet and interfamily group chiefs. The KK employed this same chain of command to collectivize agriculture and relocate large segments of the population—two of their most important programs.

Interfamily chairmen were charged with collecting the rice and then making equal distributions based on family size in the collectivization program. In the mass relocation program, interfamily chairmen were charged with making sure that no one fled and were told they would suffer if anyone did escape.⁷⁶ Interfamily chairmen were also responsible for sending recruits to the military and for disseminating information from higher echelons. In sum, it provided the KK with direct means of affecting the lives of every household.

One final word is necessary for a full appreciation and understanding of these interfamily groups. They were not novel creations of the KK. They were first developed in early China. Also, they were not unique experiments in administrative control. Such organizations have existed in other Southeast Asian countries for years. The difference lies in how the KK uses them. In some areas, interfamily groups provide a loose but reasonably effective means of keeping track of where people are and signaling the presence of strangers. In KK-controlled areas of Cambodia, they performed that function but they also provided the mechanism for forcing

the population to carry out a whole series of radically new programs.

While the staffing of these three bottom levels of government was usually a nonparty matter, the exact opposite obtains at the district level where membership in the KK seems a prerequisite to candidacy for the two elected positions—Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the District Committee. In Kampong Trach District, the election of these two officers was done from a pre-selected list of only two candidates, both of whom were party cadres.⁷⁷ The electorate was made up of three officials from each village, each of whom was allowed to cast freely an individual secret ballot. The winner became the chairman and the loser the deputy.

The first party political cadre or commissar is also found at the district level. Organizationally, this man is referred to as the Deputy District Chairman for Political and Military Affairs (Snou Kana Yobai Yothea Srok), but, in fact, he is equal in authority to the district chairman and in reality is more powerful because he directly controls the 300-man district military force.⁷⁸ He is not elected and holds his government position entirely through the Party.*

The KK government maintained a series of administrative offices at the village, district, and province levels at which travel permits and other types of paperwork could be processed. These are referred to as Open Offices (Monty Chomho). At the village level, the entire government operates out of the Village Open Office (Monty Chomho Khum). All government officials, including the police and militia, can be contacted there. This is not so at the District Open Office (Monty Chomho Srok) where

*The cadre also conducted inspections on his own and issued directives directly to village chiefs. The Russei Srok village chief said there was no doubt when attending meetings who actually ran the district.

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only the district secretary with the official stamp and a few bodyguards are present to carry on public business. The remainder of the district government and party is located in a secret zone. While the public may come to the District Open Office to conduct business, they may not go to the Area (Province) Open Office (Monty Chomho Dumbon) which is accessible only to district cadres and officials, who take all necessary paperwork to it. The remainder of the province government exists in a separate secret zone. Hamlet governments and interfamily groups do not maintain offices. They operate out of the home of the chairman.⁷⁹

One of the first steps taken by the KK was to introduce a system of passes and travel permits. The police and militia constantly patrolled and checked travelers' paperwork, so the system was rigidly enforced.

Generally, movement within one's own village is free and no pass is required. To leave one's village, it is necessary to procure a travel permit which only the village chief or, in his absence, his deputy can issue. A written or verbal certification of the legitimacy of the request from one's hamlet chief to the village chief is a necessary prerequisite. Such permits are valid only for travel within the district and for 3 days.

The District Secretary must authorize travel outside the district. His permission can be requested in person or in writing through the village office. Endorsement by the village chief of the necessity of this travel is a precondition.

Fifteen and 30-day passes could be obtained for travel outside the province, but these were granted only by province-level officials who receive such requests only through district offices and never from citizens directly.

KK cadres maintain control over and liaison with subordinate echelons through a series of overt visits and inspections to villages and hamlets. The

District Chairman and the Deputy for Political and Military Affairs sometimes stay in villages 4 or 5 days, thoroughly inspecting the implementation of all programs.⁸⁰

Another means of maintaining control over the population is through a secret policy reporting organization. Little is known about the operation of this force, except that it exists only at district level and above and its members' identities are unknown to village-level officials and the population. It is believed that it maintains agents in some villages who will report on anyone carrying out anti-KK activities.⁸¹

Refugees who escaped from all three areas spoke of the brutality of KK cadres, especially in the period from 1973 on. The conclusion reached from talking to them and evaluating the intelligence reports that dealt with this phenomenon was that such activities were quite limited in the early phases of FUNK control (1970-71) and even in the first year after the KK achieved sole power (1971-72). The Russei Srok village chief, for instance, said that in those first 2 years less than 10 people in his village were arrested as FANK spies and sent to the Kampot jail where they either died or were executed.

The Russei Srok village chief said that even prior to 1973, people in Kampot Province who were arrested were sent to a "jail from which few people ever returned." This was the province confinement center which was located in a malaria infested area on a nearby mountain. He said few people survived even 3 months there due to the mosquitos and, since the usual sentence was for 6 months, it was in effect a death sentence. Since conviction of even seemingly minor offenses could result in a 6-month sentence and since the general populace knew of the reputation of the jail, there was strict adherence to even the most minor rules. For example, violation of the rules by traveling without a permit could result in arrest and

punishment. For the first two offenses a person was given 7 and 14 days at hard labor at the district level jail. A third offense usually brought a 6-month stint in the province jail, which few people survived. Should one survive to commit a fourth violation, a village assembly was called at which KK district cadres explained that the offender had not responded to previous training and, therefore, was being sent to a high-level reeducation center for extensive long-term instruction on how to comply with the law. Such people were never seen again and were believed executed.⁸²

However, beginning in early 1973 with the concomitant final purge of the "older, less violent" Khmer Hanoi cadres, the use of terror escalated sharply. Refugees from all the areas involved stated that the older local cadres were replaced by younger men whom they had never seen before. These new cadres were described as "fanatics" who would allow no dissent or even questioning of their directives. From this point on, according to the refugees, anyone who spoke out or refused to comply was arrested and never seen or heard from again. Some refugees said that the climate of fear was so great that even within the confines of their own home a husband and wife did not dare discuss KK policies for fear of being overheard. Local leaders, including the Russei Srok village chief, were told that if any villagers were allowed to escape during the forced marches of the mass relocations, that they would be killed in their place.

Despite all these statements, there were few eyewitness reports of public executions. A few reports did indicate the wanton shooting of people in public, but most said that people were taken away and never heard from again.

The refugees believed that those arrested were not sent to jails any longer but were led away to be executed. While eyewitness accounts of executions were lacking, there was no shortage of people

who claimed to have seen friends, relatives, and neighbors led away and never return.

When asked why he carried out KK directives to implement unpopular programs, the Russei Srok village chief said he was afraid of the consequences if he refused. He later fled to South Vietnam when he feared he would be held responsible for the flight of many people from his village during its forced relocation. It seems reasonable to conclude that fear of harsh punishments and terror was the KK's prime instrument of enforcing their will and implementing their political programs.⁸³

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the foregoing description of events, it must be concluded that the Khmer Krahom in southern Cambodia did carry out a revolution in Huntington's sense of the word during the period 1972-74. It seems indisputable that the myths, political institutions, social structures, leadership, and government activity and policies were rapidly, violently, and fundamentally changed:

- Agriculture was collectivized.
- Religion was denigrated and in some cases abolished.
- The concept of the Kingdom was ended.
- Private ownership of many types of property was ended.
- The family structure was attacked.
- Traditional songs, customs, mode of dress, and beliefs were altered.
- Rule by the Communist Party was instituted.

A second conclusion is that the KK revolution occurred generally within Huntington's model of an Eastern revolution. His three-step process seems to have been precisely followed:

1. New groups such as youth, monks, and peasants were first mobilized into politics.
2. Then new political institutions were created which existed in contest with the central government.

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3. Finally, the old order was violently overthrown as the FANK were driven from all of southern Cambodia and the new political institutions established to take their place.

From the evidence, it seems clear that Huntington's two essential elements for a revolution (an explosion of political participation and the institutionalization of a new political order) have been met. The peasantry, without whom he states there can be no revolution, were definitely mobilized and brought to participate in the revolutionary process.

Yet, upon closer scrutiny, there are some disturbing dissimilarities between the Cambodian experience and Huntington's model. In answering his own question of "what turns the peasants into revolutionaries?" Huntington contends that efforts to arouse the peasantry will fail unless the social economic conditions of the peasants are such to give them concrete motives for revolt. Moreover, he states that one of the prerequisites for revolution is the desire of the social forces currently excluded from the political process to participate in these institutions. Without this political dysfunction, Huntington sees little or no chance for a revolution to occur.

Yet there is nothing to indicate that local socioeconomic conditions moved the peasantry to participate in the KK revolution. In fact, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the peasantry was opposed to almost all of the KK programs to change norms and institutions and had to be coerced and brutally forced into participation. While Huntington at times alludes to the fact that this may occur in some instances, the clear thrust of his argument is that the peasants must have perceived grievances which would motivate them to act, before the revolution can go forward. It is not suggested that the peasants had no complaints about previous governments and society. Most certainly, they did. However, it seems clear

that these problems did not motivate them to participate in the revolution led by the KK cadres. Rather, they opposed it and fled whenever possible.

The conclusion which must be drawn from this is that a revolution is possible even in the absence of a motivated peasantry. Moreover, a revolution is possible even if opposed by the bulk of the population and by the dominant social structures within the society. Huntington's contention that a revolution results in a political community in which the citizens view the government as "we" rather than "they" does not seem to obtain in this case. The evidence rather strongly demonstrates that as the revolution progressed, the citizens came to be more and more detached from the authorities and did not view themselves as part of the governing mechanism.

However, if the peasantry was not motivated by socioeconomic factors to participate in the revolution, it still remains to be determined what force can mobilize them and cause them to participate. That they must take part is certain.

The answer seems to be that a small, well-disciplined, carefully organized, and centrally directed group of cadres, willing to use harsh methods, can mobilize the peasantry, bring it to participate (albeit unwillingly) in the political process, and produce a revolutionary change in the entire political and social structure of the community.

Little is actually known about these tough cadres who produced these changes in Cambodian society. However, based on statements the refugees made, there are some observations which can be made about them.

• The KK cadres were generally young men who had apparently been given intense and rigorous ideological training. The refugees often described them as "fanatics" who would not deviate from their prescribed course of action.

- The KK cadres were generally outsiders. They were not known to the local population and had no ties to the community.

- They were relatively few in number. The KK cadres could be found only at the district level and above. They had no men permanently in the villages and hamlets.

- They were austere. They did not take anything for themselves and seemed willing to live a frugal life. They did not act for personal profit.

- They were well disciplined and centrally directed. Programs in all three of the KK military regions were carried out in almost identical fashion, despite the fact that there were three different KK chains of command involved. This demonstrated that a strong central power existed within the movement and that its subordinate echelons were carrying out its directives in an exact way.

The final conclusion, therefore, must be that the recent experience in Cambodia dictates that we add a new corollary to Huntington's model of revolution: That a revolution can be accomplished by a small group of dedicated cadres, despite the absence of grievances sufficiently serious to motivate the peasantry to participate.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The data contained in this paper was collected between July 1972 and January 1974 while I was resident in Chau Phu City, Chau Doc Province, South Vietnam. Chau Phu is located on the Vietnamese border with Cambodia and provided a window to view parts of southern Cambodia, which were largely controlled by the Communists from 1970 on. The material was obtained from the following sources:

1. Direct interviews with refugees and others from Cambodia, both with and without the aid of an interpreter;

2. Direct interviews with refugees and others from Cambodia by research

assistants employed by me, but with no Westerners present;

3. Discussions with Vietnamese and Cambodian residents of Chau Doc Province who had contact with refugees from Cambodia and people still in Cambodia;

4. Information received by Government of the Republic of Vietnam officials in Chau Doc from prisoners and ralliers from Cambodia;

5. Other information received directly from a variety of South Vietnamese and American intelligence sources.

No part of the paper is derived solely from information obtained from intelligence sources. The more detailed information within the paper comes from the in-depth interviewing of selected refugees, which was in most cases cross-checked with intelligence reporting.

It can be argued that the data and the conclusions contained in this paper must, of necessity, be tentative since a thorough "on-the-ground" examination of Khmer Communist society was not then, and is not now, possible. Even though information derived from refugees and intelligence sources could not be directly verified, it was possible to substantiate such information by inference and by corroboration.

It was recognized during the collection of the data that statements by refugees in particular could be subject to exaggeration or based on hearsay. Therefore, an effort was made to cross-check all reports with statements by other refugees and with other sources of information. In almost every case, there were two or more sources for each major piece of information. Moreover, the fact that the refugees and others interviewed had actually lived in Communist societies and directly experienced most of the Communist programs before fleeing provided a basis for assuming that the *general* picture of life and politics they conveyed reflects the reality of the situation. More significantly, refugees coming from different

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parts of Cambodia and located at separate locations in South Vietnam all told essentially the same story about conditions in areas under Communist controls.

Therefore, I am confident that while some small details may be open to question, the general picture that emerges of life within Khmer Communist society is reasonably accurate.

A further word is necessary about the refugees and other sources whose statements provide the evidence for much of this paper. Prior to 1973, travel in and out of Cambodia was relatively easy. A thriving, if limited, commerce existed between Cambodia and South Vietnam. Local merchants, particularly ethnic Cham and Chinese, moved between the two countries with great ease and played the role of commercial middlemen. Ethnic Cambodians generally moved across the border without hindrance as well, especially between Kampot and Takeo Provinces of Cambodia and Kien Giang and Chau Doc Provinces of South Vietnam, since both of the latter contained sizable ethnic Khmer populations. These people carried with them a considerable amount of information regarding life inside Cambodia which they passed on to friends, relatives, and government officials.

Beginning in 1973, restrictions on cross-border movement were introduced by the Khmer Communists which decreased the flow of trade and information. However, at approximately the same time, events occurred within Cambodia which sent the first group of refugees fleeing into South Vietnam. As these events continued, more refugees fled and eventually camps for them were established at Ha Tien, Tinh Bien, and Tay Ninh. Interviews were conducted with a number of refugees at the

first two camps, and within the paper their testimony will be cited in footnotes as "HT" for those statements given by refugees at Ha Tien and "TB" for those at Tinh Bien.

Other refugees, particularly ethnic Cham who are Muslims, did not settle into camps but were absorbed into existing Cham communities in South Vietnam. Statements made by them will be footnoted as CR for Cham refugees.

Finally, one governmental official who served in the Khmer Communist government for several years and who implemented all of their programs was interviewed. His position prior to fleeing in late 1973 was village chief of Russei Srok Village of Kampong Trach District, Kampot Province. His detailed descriptions, which were assiduously cross-checked, provided many of the details of Communist programs contained in the paper. References to information received from him will be noted with RS for Russei Srok.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Kenneth M. Quinn graduated from Loras College, Dubuque, Iowa, in 1964. He earned a master's degree from Marquette University in 1965 before joining the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in

1967. Following Vietnamese language training, he was assigned to the Republic of Vietnam from 1969 to January 1974, when he took leave to conduct independent research on the Hoa Hao Buddhist sect in Vietnam. In May 1974 he assumed his present position in the White House as Staff Member of the National Security Council. He is also preparing his doctoral dissertation in international relations for the University of Maryland.

NOTES

1. See Donald Kirk's paper "The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists" (Presented at the SEADAG Ad Hoc Seminar on Communist Movements and Regimes in Indochina, 30 September 1974) for a parallel description of this process in central Cambodia. Elizabeth Becker's "Who Are the Khmer Rouge," *Washington Post*, 10 March 1974 is one of the best journalistic accounts available.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 310.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 313-315.

10. J.L.S. Girling in his article "The Resistance in Cambodia," *Asian Survey*, July 1972, cites a figure of from 1,500 to 3,000 armed men.

11. David E. Brown's "Exporting Insurgency: The Communists in Cambodia" in Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman's *Indochina in Conflict: A Political Assessment* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972), pp. 125-135, is perhaps the most detailed discussion of this. Girling also treats it, as does Douglas Pike in "Cambodia's War," *Southeast Asian Perspectives*, March 1971, pp. 1-48.

12. Brown, p. 128.

13. HT, TB, RS.

14. Brown, pp. 127-128.

15. Kirk's SEADAG paper also provides substantial additional evidence for the fact that Sihanouk was dropped by the Khmer Krahom, as does a paper dated May 1973 circulated in Phnom Penh by Ith Sarin entitled "A Report on Nine Months in the Maquis." Sarin was a civil servant under Sihanouk who joined FUNK in the countryside and then rallied to the Lon Nol government. The paper was incorporated into a book entitled *Regrets for the Khmer Soul* in late 1973.

16. TB, HT.

17. RS, TB.

18. CR, RS, and Intelligence Reports.

19. Intelligence Reports and TB. See also Kirk's SEADAG paper and Sarin.

20. RS and Intelligence Reports.

21. RS, TB, and Intelligence Reports.

22. RS, TB, HT, and Intelligence Reports.

23. RS, TB, CR.

24. Intelligence Report. It is believed that this system was used in villages which had not been relocated *en masse*. Thus this system may have been in use only in the 1970-1972 period.

25. RS, TB.

26. RS and Intelligence Reports.

27. CR, TB, RS, and Intelligence Reports.

28. RS and Intelligence Reports.

29. RS, CR, TP, HT, and Intelligence Reports. This program only emerged in early 1973 as part of the new intense KK program.

30. RS.

31. TB, CR. This obviously was used only in villages that had not been relocated.

32. RS, TB, HT, CR, and Intelligence Reports.

33. RS, TB, and Intelligence Reports.

34. CR.

35. *Ibid.*

36. RS, CR.

37. RS, TB, CR.

38. RS, TB, CR, and Intelligence Reports.

39. RS, TB, CR, and Intelligence Reports.

40. TB and Intelligence Reports.

41. TB.

42. RS, TB.

43. RB, RS, and Intelligence Reports.

44. Intelligence Reports.

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45. TB and Intelligence Reports.
46. Intelligence Reports.
47. HT, TB, RS, and Intelligence Reports.
48. CR, RS.
49. RS.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. TB, HT, and Intelligence Reports.
53. RS.
54. *Ibid.*
55. CR.
56. RS.
57. HT, RS.
58. RS.
59. RS, TB, and Intelligence Reports.
60. RS.
61. *Ibid.*
62. CR.
63. Intelligence Reports.
64. RS and Intelligence Reports.
65. Intelligence Report.
66. RS, TB.
67. RS.
68. CR, TB, RS, and Intelligence sources.
69. Intelligence Reports.
70. CR and Intelligence Reports.

71. Similar treatment of monks was reported in other areas of Cambodia. Donald Kirk's article in the *Chicago Tribune*, 14 July 1974, reports of such activity in Kampong Thom. *Xat Lao* newspaper in Vientiane carried a story of similar persecutions in northern Cambodia (9 August 1974 edition).

72. RS.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*
75. Intelligence Reports.
76. RS, CR, and Intelligence Reports
77. RS.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*
82. *Ibid.*


83. A number of reports by journalists indicate that stories of brutality and executions have emanated from other parts of Cambodia, lending credence to the refugees' statements. Donald Kirk's 17 July 1974 *Chicago Tribune* piece is the most extensive. Tammy Arbuckle writing in the *Washington Star* on 10 April 1974 quoted refugees from northern Cambodia who had fled in Laos as telling of executions of those who resisted KK policies. The *Washington Post* editions of 24 November 1974 and 21 July 1975 both carry stories based on interviews with refugees in extreme eastern and western Cambodia, reporting the execution of those who did not toe the KK line. Thus, there are reports from every part of Cambodia compiled by different people who spoke to different groups of refugees, but all of which say the same thing: The KK executed anyone who did not comply with their orders.

Apparently this practice has been even more widespread after the fall of Phnom Penh. Henry Kamm of *The New York Times* did an extensive article, "Cambodian Refugees Tell of Revolutionary Upheaval," *The New York Times*, 15 July 1975, p. 1:6, based on interviews with refugees in three different camps in Thailand over a period of 5 days. In it Kamm wrote:


In an effort to establish as much substantiation as possible, the camps at which the interviews were conducted were chosen because of the maximum distances that separate them. There is no communication between the camps, which the Thai authorities isolate as much as possible from normal life and which are rarely visited. Still, there were no apparent discrepancies between the accounts. . . . All the refugees speak of killings by Communist soldiers, often arbitrary. Many assert that they have witnessed such killings, and most say that they saw bodies of people who had died by violence.

APPENDIX

**KHMER COMMUNIST STAFFING PATTERN:
REGION**




**KHMER COMMUNIST STAFFING PATTERN:
INTER-FAMILY GROUPS AND PEOPLE'S ASSOCIATIONS**




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
PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT (KHMER COMMUNIST) STAFFING PATTERN: PROVINCE



PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT (KHMER COMMUNIST) STAFFING PATTERN: DISTRICT



**PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT
(KHMER COMMUNIST)
STAFFING PATTERN:
VILLAGE**



**PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT
(KHMER COMMUNIST)
STAFFING PATTERN:
HAMLET**

