

and air;

-- Monitor the Khor Abdullah from observation posts set up on its shores and from the air; and

-- Carry out investigations.

To enable UNIKOM to effectively carry out its mandate, the governments of Iraq and Kuwait have been requested to extend to the mission full freedom of movement, on land and through the air, across the border and throughout the demilitarized zone; to control movement into and out of the demilitarized zone by requiring all traffic to be routed past UN observation posts; to notify UNIKOM in advance of sea and air traffic in the demilitarized zone and the Khor Abdullah; and to establish limitations on the right of their citizens to bear arms in the demilitarized zone.

As an observation mission, UNIKOM is not authorized to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the demilitarized zone. UNIKOM and its personnel can use force only in self-defense. The mission will not interfere in the normal civilian life of the area. The governments of Iraq and Kuwait will carry out all aspects of civilian administration in their respective parts of the demilitarized zone, including the maintenance of law and order.

Financial Aspects

The estimated cost for UNIKOM is \$83 million for the first 6-month period. The costs of the mission will be met from the assessed contributions of the UN member states to a UNIKOM special account. In addition, the Secretary General has called for voluntary contributions for setting up and maintaining the mission. (Source: UN Department of Public Information.) (###)

US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991

Title:

Vietnam: The Road Ahead

Solomon

Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Date: Apr 25, 1991/4/25/91

Region: Southeast Asia

Country: Vietnam, Cambodia

Subject: POW/MIA Issues, Human Rights,

Development/Relief Aid

[TEXT]

Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss another aspect of our policies toward Indochina--our effort to return to a dialogue on normalization with Vietnam. The Administration's contemporary approach to Hanoi is part of a larger effort to forge normal, constructive relations with all three states of Indochina--Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam. But today I want to focus on our policy, present activities, and future plans regarding Vietnam.

US Policy

Let me begin by saying the war is over. As the President has said, our Vietnam syndrome is behind us. The United States looks to the future and seeks reconciliation with Vietnam based on the national interests of both countries.

A genuine and durable reconciliation will require conflict resolution and stability in Southeast Asia and domestic support here at home. For reasons of returning peace and stability to the region, the United States has premised normalization of US-Vietnamese relations since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978 on the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops and advisers from Cambodia and self-determination for the Cambodian people. For reasons of domestic concern, we have long held that the pace and scope of normalization, once the process begins, should be commensurate with Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA [prisoners of war/missing in action] issue and other humanitarian concerns.

The Roadmap to Normalized Relations

In an effort to impart momentum to what we hope is the final stage of the Cambodia peace process and to accelerate progress on POW/MIAs and other humanitarian issues, I met in New York on April 9 with Vietnam's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Trinh Xuan Lang. I presented to Ambassador Lang a four-phase "roadmap" to political and economic normalization that could, in relatively short order, end the trade embargo and our opposition to lending to Vietnam by the international financial institutions as our concerns for a Cambodia settlement and POW/MIA accounting are resolved.

We want Vietnam's leadership to have no doubt that the United States is prepared to move expeditiously, provided Vietnam is also prepared to reciprocate. At the same time, given the way the Vietnam war ended, a climate of mistrust remains. Thus, in order to avoid further false starts, much less another serious setback, both Washington and Hanoi must engage in a process of trust- and confidence-building through step-by-step reciprocal concrete actions.

Vietnam needs to understand that the American government and people stand united in our goals of restoring tranquility to Cambodia, building a settlement with safeguards against a Khmer

Rouge return to power, and resolving the fate of Americans still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. For our part, we seek to build mutual understanding and credibility through the phased process of normalization laid out in the roadmap.

We do not see normalization as a zero-sum game requiring painful concessions by either party. We see it as a win-win situation. Stability in Cambodia and resolution of the humanitarian issues are in Vietnam's interest as well as our own. It is in Vietnam's interest that the international community assume the burden of resisting a Khmer Rouge return to power. Moreover, a collective response to the Cambodian problem--reflected in the UN/Paris Conference settlement process--would minimize regional suspicions and enhance prospects for stability and for a peaceful environment conducive to the economic development which Vietnam seeks.

Economic Prospects

I believe we share a mutual interest with Hanoi in seeking to realize the possibilities for the economic development of Vietnam. Vietnam needs the capital, technology, and management expertise that would flow to it with full economic normalization. And it is in our national interest to develop trade and investment ties with Vietnam as we seek to expand open trade in a world of growing economic competitiveness.

We hear much speculation about the commercial opportunities now opening up in Vietnam. Clearly, the possibilities of a market of 70 million people suddenly opening to the outside world has sparked the imagination of some in the business community. Vietnam has begun a process of reform--particularly in its pricing and exchange-rate policies--in line with some of the prescriptions of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If Hanoi's reforms deepen and foreign assistance begins to flow on a significant scale, Vietnam's medium- and long-term economic prospects are promising.

At the same time, it should be recognized that expectations of a continuing confrontation over Cambodia, internal problems of bureaucratic management, a poor infrastructure, and a lack of legal protections for business limit Vietnam's ability to attract foreign investment. In the near term, the oil and service sectors appear most promising to foreign investors, and much of some \$1.3 billion in total approved foreign investment contracts is concentrated in these areas, though largely awaiting implementation.

We look forward to the time when US firms can pursue normal trade and investment relations with Vietnam. Such a time could approach swiftly if we begin the confidence-building process we have laid out in the roadmap. We hope Vietnam shares our desire for the expanded diplomatic contact as well as cultural and economic exchanges that a fully normal relationship would facilitate. The four-phase process of settling the Cambodia conflict and resolving our POW/MIA concerns is the most rapid path to this end.

Cambodia

Two weeks ago I was privileged to address this subcommittee at some length about the Cambodia peace process. I will not review today the issues discussed at that time, except to reiterate that the linkage between normalization with Vietnam and a political settlement in Cambodia has been the policy of three presidents and five secretaries of state. We recognize there can be no peaceful settlement for Cambodia without Vietnam's support. It was Vietnam, after all, that established the present regime in Phnom Penh over a decade ago and remains the regime's staunchest ally.

Moreover, as I mentioned during our last session, Vietnam still retains several thousand military and some civilian advisers in Cambodia. We understand that Hanoi's influence in Cambodia is not unlimited. But there is no question that Vietnam enjoys considerable influence with the Phnom Penh authorities.

Thus, we believe there is an organic connection between our policies toward Vietnam and Cambodia. Given the history of this region, including Vietnam's decade-long occupation of, and continuing involvement in, Cambodia, we believe Vietnam has an obligation to use its influence to bring about a just and durable peace. Once it does so--and as we see improved cooperation on humanitarian issues--there will be a firm basis for a new relationship between the United States and Vietnam.

Humanitarian Issues

Let me now turn to the humanitarian matters that will affect the pace and scope of normalization. These issues reflect concerns deeply held by the Administration, the Congress, and the American people. Only with resolution of these issues can we put our relationship with Vietnam on the solid foundation of broad public support.

POW/MIAs

The most compelling and deeply felt humanitarian concern is resolution of the POW/MIA issue. This has been a consistent US position. As President Bush has said, and as President Reagan said before him, the US government considers resolution of this issue a matter of the highest national priority.

Our first priority in POW/MIA accounting is resolution of the "discrepancy cases" of American servicemen known to have been alive when captured and whose fates Vietnam should certainly have some knowledge of. Resolving these cases has been the primary focus of the joint investigations promoted under the Vessey initiative. We also continue to stress to the Vietnamese our serious interest in pursuing reports suggesting that Americans may still be alive in Vietnam.

Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi on POW/MIA matters, has just returned from 2 days of meetings in Vietnam with Foreign Minister Thach. Supported by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford, the Executive Director of the National League of Families Ann Mills Griffiths, and my deputy Ken Quinn, General Vessey gave Minister Thach our

assessment of progress since their meeting here in Washington last October. We have found some improvements in cooperation but limited results, and Vietnam really needs to accelerate unilateral and joint efforts to achieve the results we are seeking.

It was with this objective in mind that General Vessey and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach announced on April 20 that the United States would establish a temporary office in Hanoi to support the POW/MIA accounting process. Our decision reflected a previous understanding that we would establish such a presence in Vietnam if we determined it would facilitate resolution of the issue, including advance planning for joint activities and efforts to resolve live sighting reports on which we request assistance. The office will be staffed by Defense personnel augmented by POW/MIA specialists who will rotate through on temporary duty. It will have no diplomatic or political responsibilities and should not be seen as a first step in the normalization process. It can, however, help to accelerate normalization once a Cambodia settlement is signed in Paris if its activities are productive in resolving POW/ MIA issues.

Orderly Departure Program

Release of all re-education camp political prisoners has also been a consistent US goal. The Orderly Departure Program (ODP), with Vietnam's cooperation, has undergone considerable expansion in recent years. Under the ODP, the United States takes in Vietnamese citizens associated with our country and its citizens by work or family ties, including Amerasians. This month we raised the interview rate to 10,000 per month, twice the level of a year ago. As a result, overall ODP departures will be nearly double last year's rate. This dramatic expansion constitutes a major contribution to the comprehensive plan of action for Indochina refugees by bolstering ODP as a safe, predictable, and realistic alternative to departures by boat.

We are pleased that the ODP program now also includes former re-education center detainees, who began arriving in the United States only in January of 1990. Last fiscal year, about 9,000 former detainees and family members came to the United States. We hope to double the flow this fiscal year. While we are encouraged by this development, we continue to ask Vietnam to free all political prisoners and to allow all of them who are eligible for the ODP to depart for the United States if they so desire.

The Vessey Initiative: Humanitarian Assistance.

Just as we ask Vietnam to help with our humanitarian concerns, we encourage American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to address the humanitarian needs of Vietnam's citizens, particularly in the areas of prosthetics and child survival. Since 1987, when General Vessey pledged our support in these areas, there has been a series of meetings in Hanoi between Vietnamese and American officials at the working level to review progress and identify areas where useful activities could be carried out.

The US government encourages the work of NGOs which raise funds and gather material donations to help the people of Vietnam. And the American NGO community has responded generously to

Vietnam's humanitarian needs. As announced by Secretary Baker last July, to facilitate their efforts we have eased licensing procedures for humanitarian assistance. Many NGOs not previously active in Vietnam, or not active since 1975, have started new programs. A number of new groups, particularly veterans organizations, have been formed for the specific purpose of providing humanitarian assistance to Vietnam. Since last July 18, 36 different organizations or individuals have been licensed to provide humanitarian donations to Vietnam. Financial contributions since that time total approximately \$4.3 million.

Although up to now no US government assistance has gone directly to Vietnam, we did assist indirectly in the repatriation of nearly 16,000 Vietnamese citizens trapped in the Gulf region during the crisis by contributing approximately \$11 million to the International Organization of Migration.

In addition, I am pleased to announce today that, in the context of the Vessey Initiative, we will be making available through the US Agency for International Development approximately \$1 million to address Vietnamese humanitarian needs in the areas of prosthetics.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, Vietnam is a country of some 70 million people with a rich history and culture. It is a nation with which we are profoundly connected by our historical experience and by more than 1 million Vietnamese residing in the United States. It is also a country which--if it can escape the trap of its security burdens and impediments to economic growth--could over time come to play an increasingly significant role in Southeast Asia.

Our current efforts toward normalization reflect an interest in putting US-Vietnamese relations on a new basis. As Secretary Baker told Foreign Minister Thach last fall in New York, the United States is prepared to turn a page in history. But the effort has to be mutual. The "roadmap" proposal we have presented to Hanoi is a good faith effort to establish step-by-step the trust and confidence necessary to move beyond a difficult period of history and begin a new era in US relations with Vietnam--and indeed, in our relations with all three countries of Indochina. (###)

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Title:

A Multi-faceted Approach to Non-proliferation

Clarke

Source: Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary for
Politico- Military Affairs

Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Technology and
National Security of the Joint Economic Committee,